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ARISTOTLE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
Fred D» Miller, Jr.
Bowline) Green State University 
SAGP March 1986
1. Introduction
Aristotle discusses property in many different contents 
throughout the Politics as well as in other works, most notably 
the Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. In this paper I. argue that
these disconnected discussions provide the materials to construct 
a theory of property rights. I am self-consciously following the 
lead of Barker who refers to "the vindication of the right of 
private property which appears in the second book of the 
Pol i tics1 (1906, p. 248). In this as in many other instances
Barker was in turn following the lead of Newman (e.g., 1887, I, 
pp. 167-168). This interprêtation must, however, be defended 
anew, because many recent.commentators have categorically 
asserted that there is no place in Aristotle's thought for 
rights: these include Alasdair MacIntyre, Μ. X. Finley, Leo
Strauss, John Finnis, and T. H. Irwin. In "Are There Any Rights 
in Aristotle?" (read to the SAGP in October, 1934) I argued on 
general grounds that concepts comparable? to modern concepts of 
rights can be attributed to Aristotle because he makes normative 
claims which closely approximate Hohfeldian rights claims, and I 
have further contended that the theoretical objections against 
interpreting Aristotle in terms of rights rely upon tendent1aus!y 
narrow construíais of rights. I shall not attempt to rehearse 
those arguments here but want instead to take up the case for 
rights to property specifically.
I shall begin by indicating in quite general terms how I am 
using the expression "property rights" in this paper. Property 
rights are legal or moral relationships involving individuals and 
objects, consisting of aggregates or clusters of different sorts 
of rights or their correlatives (cp„ Becker 1977, p.'21). For 
example, the right to an object such as a jar of olives typically 
involves both a liberty to possess it and to put. it to various 
uses as well as a claim right imposing duties of noninterference 
on the part of others with its possession or use. This typically 
implies the right to compensation or restitution if there is 
interference or harm to the object by others. It also typically 
involves the power to offer the object for sale or to give it 
away, which changes the legal or moral relationships of others. 
And it typically involves an immunity against others putting the 
object up for sale or giving it away without the owner's consent. 
My repeated use of "typically" is deliberate. The various 
elements into which the relations of ownership and property have 
been analyzed are not all necessarily present in all cases. Thus, 
although A. M» Honore (1961) distinguishes eleven such elements
the right to possess, to use, to manage, the right to the 
income, to the capital, to security, to transmissibi1ity, the 
absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, the liability to 
execution, and the residual character of property ·-—  he contends 
that while all of these elements are required for full ownership,
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none is a necessary condition -for "owning" something« In
asc r i b i n g a c on c ep t of p r op er” t y .rig h t s t o Ar i st o t le I am claiming
t h at elements play a n i îîi p o r t a n t r *ole i n h i s η o r mat i ve assertions
ab out p r op er t y an d weal t h i n t h e Po 1 i t i cs an d ot h er* wor k s « I n
t h e f o 11 o w i n g se c t i ο η I s h a 11 s la g g e s t a w o r k i n g c ο n c e p t o f
p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n A r i «!> t o 11 e ' s o w n te r m s «
A t h e o r y o -f p r o p e r i y r i g h t s s h c:) u. 1 d p r ovide a n s w e r s to a 
number o-f questions about property rightss (1) What individuals 
can properly hold rights to property? (2) To what objects can 
t h e y have p r o p e r t y r i g h 11:- ? < 3 ) W h a t -f o r m i s t a k e n b y exe r c i s e o f
property rights? (4) What is the general moral justification for 
t h e the s i s t h a t i n d i v i d la a 1 s s h o u 1 d have p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ? < 5 )
U n d e r what c i r c la m s t a n c e s d o i n d i v :i. d u a 1 s j u s 11 y a c: q la i r e title, to 
. s p e c i f :l. «:: oh j e c t s a n d u n d e r w h a t c: :i. r c u m s t a n c. e s d o t h e y c o m e t o 
possess them unjustly? (6) Under what circumstances, if any v may 
p r o p e r t y r i g h t s to e a I i e n a b I e , d e t e a s i b le,' o r q la a I :l -f i a b le? < 7 ) 
w ha t s p e e i f i c s o c i a 1 p o 1 i e i e s a r e i m p 1 i e d b y p r o p e r t y r i g h t s s 
i « e « i n what way s h o u 1 d p r a p e r t y r i g h t s b e p r ote c t e d a n d w h a t 
c on st raintB., if any, do individual property rights place lap on the 
«:: ο n <:l u c t o f g o v e r n m e n t ? I n a <;> c r i b :l. n g to A r i s t o tie a t h e o r y of 
ρ r o p e r t y r i. g h t s I s h o la 1 d b e la n d e r s t o o d a s  a m biti'ously. c: 1 ai mi n g 
t h a t A r i s t o 11 e o f f e r s a n s· w e r s t o q u e s t i o n s s la c h a s t In ese«
T h e t e s t o f t h i s i n t e rp r e t a t i ο n is whet h e r it does i ndeed 
ρ r o vide a way o f c in n n e c t i n g A r i s t o 11 e ' s s c a 11 e r e d c I a i m s a b o u t 
property into a more comprehensible whole and of critically 
e k a in i n :L n g t h e m e r i t s o f t In e s e c I a i m s w i t h i n A r i s t o tie's b r o a d e r 
I“) In i 1 o s o p h i c: a 1 f r a m e w o r k .< I s h a 11 r e t u r n t o t h i s i n the f i n a I 
section«
2. A Working Concept of Property Rights
The ancient Greeks recognize a distinction which is 
f u n d a m e in t a I t o t h e c o in c e p t i ο n o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s t h e d i s t i n c t i ο n 
between the mere possession of an object and the legal ownership 
of i t « PI ato r ecogn i z es tin i s j ur i d i cal d i st i net i on when he makes 
Socrates say that the goal of the -rulers in conducting law suits 
wi 11 be " that i ndi vi dual s shoul d nei ther have (echosi ) another ' s 
tin lings ( tallotr ia ) nor be depr i ved of thei r own th i ngs ( ton 
hau ton ) 15 ( Republ 1 c IV, 433e6-8 ) » Si m i 1 a r 1 y t  h e o r a t. o r H egésippos
states that "it is possible to have (echein) another's things and 
not all those who have, have their own things* but many have 
acquired (kektentai) another's things" (CDem. I 7.26) Again, 
Theophrastus asserts that even if goods for sale have changed 
hands, the seller remains the? owner of the property (kurion tou 
ktematos > until he receives the payment. (Stobaeus, FI or i 1 eg. 
44.22? cf. Harrison I960, I, p. 204)
Th er e wer e e1 ab or at e 1 eg a1 p r oc edur es t h r oug ht whic h p r op er t y 
owners could seek protection and compensation? this is especially 
evident in the Athenian legal system, about which the most is 
known (cf., Harrison 1968? MacDowel1 1978)., Nevertheless, the 
Greeks do not have an abstract term which unambiguously stands 
for legal ownership as such (cf„ Finley 1951, pp» 53 ff«.? Jones 
1956, p« 201 η» 4g Harrison 1968, I, ρ. 201? MacDowe11 1978, p. 
133). Ousia, for example, is used for the concrete property 
which an individual owns (cf. Plato Republ1c VIII, 551b3?
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Antiphon Tetr. A(b)12) rather than to designate ownership as 
such,. The verbs echein, kratein .and kekteshai do not have special 
legal or moral implications. This underscores, I think, the 
importance .of Aristotle's attempt in Rhetoric I. 5, 1361al2-24 to 
offer a general treatment of. the notion of wealth. (I shall 
discuss the argument of which this passage is a part in the 
following section.) This may be the earliest such attempt by a 
Greek thinker, and it ' is of special interest here? because it 
mentions central elements of the concept of property rights.
The discussion begins with an enumeration of the parts (sere) 
of wealths plenty of moneys possession (ktesis) of land and 
estates? possession of movable objects, animals, and slaves.
Since the Greeks included with land ownership the buildings and 
.crops on it Ccf,, Harrison 1968, I, p. 202), Aristotle has 
enumerated the main types of property recognised by Greek, law 
(cf. MacDowell 1978, p. 133),, In this passage Aristotle states a 
number of conditions which must, be met if one is to fully qualify 
as being wealthy (ploutein):
Cl) the properties are-? numerous, large, and beautiful;;
(2) the properties are liberal (.eleutheria) or useful 
(chresima)$
(3) the properties are secure (asphale) ?
<4) the properties are one's own (oikeia) 5
C5) one is actually using the property rather than 
merely owning it.
I understand (2) as disjunctive because Aristotle defines the two 
conditions so that they are mutually exclusive3 useful 
properties are productive, those from which we derive income or 
rents? whereas liberal properties are those from which we derive 
pleasure but no further advantage,, (This distinction resurfaces 
in Pol i tics I, 4? see section 4.) The conditions especially 
important for my purposes are (3) and (4). Aristotle explains 
what he means by each at 1361al9—23s "A criterion of 'security' 
is possession (kekteshai) in a given place and in such a manner 
that the use of the objects is up to oneself iaph’ hauto ) ; and a 
criterion of ''being one's own <oikeia) or not1' is when the 
alienation of it is up to oneself Ceph’ hauto)% I mean by 
'alienation'(apallotriosin) giving and selling." So defined, (3) 
and (4) differ importantly from Cl) which distinguishes wealth 
from more modest levels of property possession? and from C5) 
which distinguishes leading an actually wealthy life from being 
materially capable of doing so. (3) and (4), in contrast, are 
preconditions not only of wealth but of ownership in general.
Harrison finds it "noteworthy that Aristotle should single 
.out the power to alienate as the true sign of a thing being one's 
own (okeion) ., " C1968, I, p. 202? (compare Jones 1956, p. 198 on 
the place of this power in ownership for Greek law generally).
It is also important for my argument that (3) and C4) correspond 
to central elements in the modern Anglo-American concept of 
property rights. To wit Becker (1977, p. 20) argues that among 
Honore's elements the right to the capital is "the most 
fundamental of the elements, if only because it includes the 
right to destroy, consume, and alienate. (Alienation is 
understood to exchanges, gifts, and just 'letting go.')" In the 
light of this parallel, I take (3) and (4) to constitute an
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Aristotelian working concept of property rights, namely:
X' has a property right, in P iff» X' possesses P in such a 
way that the use of P is up to X', and the alienation of 
P (giving P a way or selling P) is up to X'«
It is reasonable to suppose that this analysis has a force 
comparable to following Hohfeldian assertions: X' is at. liberty to 
use P in one way or in another way, in the sense that X is under 
no obligation to use P in a particular way» And X has a claim 
against others not to be interfered with in his use of P. (Cp.
1360bl6—17s the defining conditions of happiness include "the 
power to protect and put to use" one's possessions»> X has the 
power to transfer ownership of P to Y by giving it. or selling it 
to him. And X has the liberty to do so, in the sense that X' is 
.under no obligation to refrain from alienating P« (Cp. Grimaldi 
who remarks that apallotriosai "Aristotle defines immediately as 
the right, to give or to sell (what, one possesses) 5 1980, p» 112»)
In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that good sense 
can be made of Aristotle's discussions of property in the 
Pol 11ics if he is understood as using the working concept, of 
property rights just described»
3. The Eudaimonistic Justification
One important form of justification of property concerns its 
relationship to eudaimon ia or happiness»22 In the context of such 
a justification occurs the analysis of wealth discussed in the 
preceding section. Rhetoric I, 5 commences with an assertion of 
teleology similar to the openings of the Pol iti cs and Ni cornachean 
Ethics. Everybody, individually and collectively, has a goal, 
and this is happiness and its parts» We should understand what 
happiness is and what, its parts are, because all those who try to 
persuade others presuppose what I shall call the 
eudaminonistic principies
One ought to do the things which provide happiness or 
any of its parts, or increase rather than decrease it, 
and ought, not to do those things which destroy or hinder 
it or make those things that, are contrary to it 
E1360b11-141 „
This is clearly a consequentialist principle, which prescribes an 
end for public policy (1360b4) as weil 1 as for self-interested 
individual decision making (cp. 1360b4, 1360b31—1361al2.
Aristotle then offers an account of happiness:
Let. then happiness be (A) doing well with excellence [virtue], 
or (B) self-sufficiency of life, or (C) the most 
pleasant, life with security, or (D> a thriving state of 
possessions and bodies with the power to protect and put 
them into action C1360b14-173. 3 
Aristotle; is in effect treating happiness as a "cluster concept," 
which includes both common beliefs about eudaimortia and 
philosophical theories» It is not clear whether these are meant, 
to be necessary or sufficient conditions of happiness.
■Nevertheless, on the basis of this account., Aristotle infers that 
happiness has numerous parts'*, including external goods, one of 
which is wealth <1360b20, 28)J
The eudaimonistic justification is a straightforward
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application of the eudaimonistic principle to wealths
I « One should do the things which provide happiness or 
any of its parts, or increase rather than decrease 
it, and should not do those things which destroy or 
hinder it or make those things that are contrary to 
it.
2. Wealth is a part, of happiness,.
3« therefore, one should do the things which provide 
wealth or increase rather than decrease it and 
should not do those things which destroy or impede 
its use.
Premiss (2) is based on two of the disjunctive conditions of 
happiness! <B> self-sufficiency of life and (D) a. thriving state 
of possessions and bodies with the power to protect and put. them 
into action. Moreover, as I noted in the previous section, 
Aristotle states that wealth must satisfy the conditions of being 
secure and being one's own, conditions which aire central elements 
of property rights! the use and alienation of the possessions 
are up to the owner.
Admittedly care must be used with an argument from the first 
book of the Rhetoric which is generally regarded■as early in 
composition (cf. Duering 1966, p. 118). Both premisses of the 
above argument, seem to be open to objection. < 1 > speaks of 
"parts" of happiness. Aristotle also speaks in this way in the 
Eudemian Ethics I, 2, 1214b26-27; 5, 1216a39-40; and II, 1,
1219bΠ -13 and in the Maana Moral i a II, Θ, 1184a18-19, 26-29, 
30—31, but he does not use this sort of language in the 
N i c oftiac h ean Et h i c s ( c p. Cooper 1975, p. 122) „ Even more 
controversially, (2) calls wealth a part of happiness. Not only
do the ethical works not treat wealth a.s a part of happiness, but 
they point out a serious mistake which (2) might, be taken to 
commit, namely, of confusing a necessary condition of happiness 
with a part of happiness (Eudemi an Ethics I, 2, 1214b24—27; 
Politics VII. 1, 1323b24—29; 13, 1332a25-27>„
Nevertheless, I think 
that the recent work of Cooper (1985) suggests
that the argument of the Rhetoric is, on the whole, consistent 
with Aristotle's mature conception of happiness, at least in so 
f a r as it is expresse d i n the first boo k o f N i c omac h ean Ethics ■ 
This work does not merely claim, with the Magna Moralia that the 
happy person needs external goods (II, 8 , 1206b33—34; cp.
Pol11i cs VII, 13, 1331b41-1332al), but, as Cooper argues, it 
offers a definition of happiness which includes the external 
goods (ta ekta agatha) ! "thaxt person is eudaimon (flourishes, is 
happy) who is active in accordance with the external goods not 
for just any old period of time but for a complete life" (1985, 
p. 174 translating I, 10, 1101al4—16; cp. 8 , 1099a31 ff.)» And 
these "external goods" include wealth and the other items listed 
in Rhetoric I, 5 (Cooper 1985, p. 177). The claim that external 
goods are a constituent of "the best life" is similarly made in 
Politics VIIT 1, 1323b40—1324a1. Aristotle qualifies these claims 
when he treats the value of. external goods as derived from that 
of virtuous activities, as Ni cornac heart Ethics VII, 13, 1153bl7—19 
makes clear! "... no activity is perfect when it is impeded, and 
happiness is a perfect thing; this is why the happy man needs the
Page 6
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goods of the body and external goods, i.e. those of fortune, viz. 
in order that he may not be impeded in these ways."
Nevertheless, virtuous activity essentially requires the external 
goods; for example, an act of generosity essentially requires the 
possession of wealth. Hence, on Cooper's interpretation,
Aristotle is entitled to treated them as parts of eudaimonia 
because they "are circumst.anc.es and conditions reference to which 
is actually part of the essential characterization of the 
virtuous activities that constitute eudaimonia, on Aristotle's 
theory.” (1985, p„ 192 n. 11)
However, the Rhetoric justification needs to be qualified to 
the extent that wealth is a "part" of happiness only in the sense 
of being an essential condition of its attainment. And the 
justification would be restricted to property which plays an 
essential role in the activities of happiness, e.g. property used 
in acts of generosity. It would not apply to property'used to 
maintain life, e.g. one's food, bed, or clothing, or to property 
used to produced other goods.
4. The Instrumental ist Justification of Property
Ealitics I, 4 -10 offers an alternative to the eudeaimonistic 
justification of property rights and places ownership and 
acquisition in a teleological context. Aristotle's treatment of 
property is, of course, bound up with the defense of slavery, but 
it includes arguments concerning property in general, and I shall 
attempt to abstract these from the reasoning exclusively 
concerned with slavery.
The argument of Politics I, 4 presupposes the eudaimonistic 
principle and also relies upon the claim (already set forth in I, 
2 ) that the household is the social institution necessary for 
maintaining life and is therefore a prerequisite for the good 
life or happiness. I offer the following reconstruction of 
1253b23—33, 1254a9-13s
1. One cannot live or live well without the necessary 
things.
2. CThe function of household management is maintaining 
life.3 (Tacit premiss)
3. Just as in specialized arts, the proper instruments 
(ta oikeia organa) must be present to fulfill their 
function (ergon), the household manager must have 
the proper instruments to fulfill his function.
4« CProperty cons ists in instruments used in a 
household or state.3 (cp. 8, 1254al6)
5. Therefore, a possession (Artena) i s an instrument for 
life, separable from the possessor, and property 
(ktesis) is a number of such instruments.
6. A possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; 
for the part is not only a part of something else, 
taut wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a 
possession.
7. Therefore, property is a part of the household.
This argument raises a number of problems. It is unclear
about, whom the property belongs tos It seems to shift from 
saying that an individual qua household manager must possess
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property (clearly implied by 4 and 5) to saying that, property is 
a part of the household« (This .unclarity is also found in the 
case of slaverys is the slave a part of the household or of the 
master? cf« I, 6 , 1255bl 1-12'J ) Also the conclusion (7) seems 
to be rejected on second thought in later chapters (I, 10$ VII,
8$ cf« Newman 1887, II, p« 135)» Further, when Aristotle defines 
possessions arid property as practical instrument, he 
counterintuitively rules out productive instruments as 
possessions. But here it. seems he is using "possession" in a 
narrow, technical sense, and his purpose in so doing is to 
underscore that the present justification is applicable only to 
practical property«
The instrumentalist justification differs from the 
.eudaimonistic. in that it only requires property to be a necessary 
condition, not a part, of the end. Moreover, the end in the case 
of the instrumentalist justification is more broadly conceived as 
well as the good life« Consequently, it can accommodate a wider 
range of property than the eudaimonistic justification (as 
narrowly construed at the end of section 3), including 
possessions necessary for everyday subsistence (although as noted 
above productive property is still left out of account). But in 
both cases» Aristotle has argued that ought to possess certain 
types of property because they are necessary for well-being.
5. Justice and Injustice in Acquisition
A central question which a theory of property rights must 
answer iss how can people originally acquire property justly? 
Aristotle addresses a question which is closely related to this 
when he examines the art of acquisition (chrematistike) in 
Politics I, 8-11. The question takes the -forms which of the? 
forms of the art of acquisition are according to nature or 
contrary to nature? This is for Aristotle also a question of 
what forms are just or unjust, because he relates nature and 
justice by means of two fundamental principles!!' a positive 
principle according to which everything in a social context which 
is according to nature is just (Politics I, 5, 1255a1-3; III, 17, 
1287b37—39; VII, 9, 1329al3—17), and a negative principle 
according to which everything in a social context which is 
contrary to nature is unjust (I, 3, 1253b20—23; 10, 1258a40—b2; 
VII, 3, 1325b7—10$ both principles are stated together at 1,5, 
1254al7—20; III, 16, 1287a8-18)« » This implies that to establish 
that an art of acquisition is according to nature is to establish 
that one who is practicing this art. is justly acquiring property; 
and to establish that such an art. is contrary to nature is to 
establish that, one who is practicising this art is acquiring 
property unjustly.
Aristotle first argues that, one form of the art of 
acquisition is according to nature in a somewhat disjointed and 
difficult argument. (1,8). I offer the following reconstruction.
gart I (1256al9-b7.)
1. There are many kinds of food.
2. It is impossible to live without food.
3. Animals have many different modes of life according to 
what is advantageous for -food.
Aristotle on Property Rights
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•4. [Nature provides animals with whatever is advantageous.3 
<Tacit premiss; compare Physics II, 8)
5» Therefore, nature has differentiated the modes of life of 
an i maIs in r e1 ation to their f ac i I i t i es and p r ef er enees 
for food.
6 . Similarly, men have many different modes of life which 
involve industry that is self-grown Cautophut on> and not 
by exchange or retai 1 trade —  viz. the shepherd, 
husbandman, brigand, fisherman, and hunter.
7. [Therefore, nature has differentiated the modes of life 
humans in relation to their facilities and preferences 
for food.] (Tacit inference from 5 and 6)
Part.I,|.(1256b7-30>,
8. Nature makes nothing incomplete and does nothing in vain.
a. [What, is needed to make X complete exists for the 
sake of X.3
b. [What exists for the sake of X is given to X by 
nature.3
9» The yolks, milk., etc. needed by the young at birth are 
given to them by nature.
10. Similarly, [since animals need plants for food,! plants 
exist for the sake of animals.
11» Humans need animals for the food, clothing, and 
instruments and as beasts of burden.
12. Similarly, animals exist for the sake of man.
Conclusions (1256b7-10. 26-3Q
13. Therefore, such property Uctesis) [i.e. needed for 
subsistence! is given by nature to all both a birth and 
when grown. <cp. 10, 1258a34—37)
14. Therefore, one kind of acquisitive art belongs by nature 
to household management, which must, be present (or 
household management must provide that it be present), 
and this acquisitive art has to do with those storeable 
things which are necessary and useful for the community 
of the polis or household, (cf. Newman 1887, II, p. 179)
I treat (13) as following from both parts because of'the oun at 
1256b7), which indicates that it follows in some way from Part I, 
and because of the gar at blO, which implies that Part II is 
intended to support (13). The oun at b26 implies that (14) 
follows at least from Part II.
I shall not attempt, to recapitulate in detail the objections 
which have been leveled against Aristotle's argument by Newman, 
Susemihl and Hicks, and more recent critics. They have argued 
for example that the first part identifies the natural with 
"primitive," which cannot support the conclusion Aristotle wants. 
I do want to call attention to premiss (8 ) which occurs also in 
the arguments for the organic theory of the polis in Pol i ti cs I, 
2. I haves unpacked two teleological principles, (13a) and (8b), 
which will, I think, make the argument go through.
Unfortunately, (8a) and (8b) would support the conclusion that 
human beings exist for the sake of and are given by nature to 
lions and other carnivorous beasts. Hence Aristotle is probably 
assuming another principle such as that at VII, 14, 1333a21-24¡¡ 
"The inferior always exists for the sake of the superior, and 
this, is manifest in matters of art as well as of nature. And the
Page 9
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superior is that which possesses reason." This principle would 
postulate a hierarchy of natural kinds along the following liness 
If natural kind Ki has end Ei and natural kind Ka has 
end E» and Ei is superior to Ea, then entities of kind 
Ka exist for the sake of, and are given by nature to, 
entities of kind Ki.
These teleological principles regarding the gift of nature have a 
place in Aristotle's theory of natural ac. qui si ti on comparable to 
the basic principles in Locke's theory! from the view of 
revelation that "Bod has given the earth to the children of men"; 
or from the view of assumption of "natural reason" that "men 
being once born have a right to their preservation, and 
consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature 
•affords for their subsistence." ( Second T reat i se 5, 26).
However, Aristotle wants to establish that the acquisitive 
art. is natural without establishing too much! he wants to 
establish that it is a natural art on1 y in so far as it provides 
the necessary means for the natural ends of the household art and 
statesmanship.
Part II.I ( 1256b50-59)
15. No instrument (organon) belonging to any art is without a 
limit whether in number or in size.
16. True wealth is a collection of instruments for the 
householder and statesman. (Compare Politics I, 4)
17. Therefore, a limit (teraa) of wealth has been fixed.
18. Therefore, the amount of property sufficient for good 
life is not unlimited (apeiros) .
19. [The good life is the end of the polis.I (Tacit 
premiss;! compare Pol i t i cs I, 2)
20. Therefore, true wealth consists of such things Cas in 
143.
21. [An acquisitive art which provides true wealth is 
according to nature.3
22. Therefore, an acquisitive-; art belongs according to nature; 
to householders and statesmen.
Natural acquisition has a limit resulting from its 
subordination to the household art statesmanship, for which it 
produces the instruments. The basis for (15) is suggested later 
at 9, 1257b27—28: the end of an art may be unlimited but. not the 
means, for the the end is always the limit (peras) » But the idea 
of a "limit" as used in (19) is unclear because a limit may be 
understood as a baseline (minimum) or a ceiling (maximum). Does 
the end require that a certain baseline of resources be acquired 
or a. certain ceiling? If the; end is "the good life" it would seem 
more reasonable to interpret the limit as a baseline, but. 
Aristotle interprets it as a ceiling.
His reason for this become somewhat clearer in I, 9, as we 
shall see (cf. also VII, 4, 1326a35—40)» For in Poli11cs 1, 9 
Aristotle contrasts this agreeable acquisitive art with another 
acquisitive art which has no limit (1256b41—1257al> and is due to 
exerience and art rather than due to nature (1257a4—55. This 
other art is not according to nature (ou kata phusin) but is 
against nature (para phusin)» It involves commerce or retail 
exchange, which he seeks to distinguish from another type of 
exchange which he finds unobjectionable. Thus the argument falls
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into two parts; a defense of barter or simple exhange (allage) 
and a critique of commerce (kapelike).
Defense of Barter (1257a6-50)
1. Each piece of property has two uses; Cone is to use it to 
satisfy one's wants,! the other is to exchange it.
2. The proper use of P is that for the sake of which P has 
come into existence.
33 A piece of property (e.g. a shoe) has two uses; .e.g. to 
be worn and to be exchanged.
4. A piece of property did not come into existence for the 
sake of barter.
5» Therefore, barter is not. its proper use.
6. Activities carried out in order to replenish one's
natural self-sufficiency are the result of the natural 
and are not contrary to nature.
7» Barter is carried out in order to replenish one's natural 
self suff i ci ency.
8 . Therefore, barter is not contrary to nature.
The Critique of Commerce <1257b20-1258al8)
1. Commerce is the art of producing wealth by exchanging 
things with money.
2. The other arts, e.g. medicine, pursue their ends without 
limit.
3. Similarly, this form of acquisition whose end is wealth 
and the possession of property pu.ru.ses its end without
1 i ini t.
4. For the natural acquisitve art all wealth has a limit.
5« Therefore, commerce is an unnatural acquisitive art.
6 . The unlimited end of commerce is due to a false idea of 
the good life, vis. as unlimited gratification of 
desires, which requires unlimited wealth.
7. An art which pursues the unlimited gratification of 
desires leads human beings to use their powers in a way 
not according to nature [not according to the mean of 
moral virtue"!.
8» Therefore, commerce is an unnatural art.
The analogy between commerce and medicine in Aristotle's 
critique is both illuminating and disturbing. It provides a 
reason for saying that the end of commerce is unlimited, but it 
also raises the questions why is commerce, but not medicine, an 
unnatural art? It is not that commerce employs a perverted 
instrument, viz. filthy lucre, because it uses the same 
instrument, as the natural art < 1257b35—38) » (Sinclair's 
suggestion that Aristotle means to contrast commerce with 
medicine runs afoul of the houto kai at b28 which he translates 
as "but.") Aristotle's attempt to distinguish them relies upon 
the claim (6) that commerce is the result of excessive desires 
and, implicitly, of a a morally vicious disposition. It is not 
however entailed by the definition of commerce that it is the 
result of excessive desires. For the definition leaves it open 
that an individual could practice the art in an excessive manner 
but it no more entails that this must happen than does the 
definition of medicine. Aristotle simply dismisses without 
argument the possibility that one could observe the mean while 
engaging in commerce.
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Whatever difficulties it raises, Aristotle's prescription of 
a limit for natural acquisition .is an interesting parallel to the 
Lockean proviso for just acquisition, namely that there must be 
"enough, and as good left in common for others»" (5, 27). To be 
sure, Aristotle's argument for a limit is based upon -
self-regarding considerationss excessive acquisition will 
prevent the agent from achieving the good life. Nevertheless, it 
is noteworthy that when Aristotle sums up his conclusions in II, 
10 he asserts that retail exchange is justly censured "for it is 
not. according to nature but from one another" <1258bl— 2) » This 
very brief remark does not obviously follow from the critique and 
would require extensive and speculative unpacking. But one way of 
reconstructing his argument is that commercial acquisition is a 
zero-sum game in which for every gainer there is·a loser, so that 
if any person exceeds his limit, he can do so only by taking 
something away from someone else» In this sense one would be 
making a unnatural, hence unjust gain "from one another»" 
Moreover, since Aristotle evidently assumes that nature provides 
a fixed ‘supply of goods just, sufficient for individuals to 
satisfy their natural ends (cf» 10, 1258a34—37), he would regard 
an individual who significantly exceeded the natural limit of 
acquisition as depriving others of what they need.
6. Private Property, Coalman Use
The arguments of Pol it ics I are concerned with the property 
rights of a person qua householder or statesman» But the 
discussion of private property in Pol i ti cs II, 5 occurs within a 
wider context in which it is evident that Aristotle is concerned 
with the property of individuals <hekastoi)„ This is evident in 
his criticism of Socrates' alleged hypothesis that the greater 
the unity of the polis the better, which leads Socrates to 
collapse the polis into an individual and to ignore that the 
polis is a natural plurality C1261al5-21>« Aristotle points out 
that Socrates' scheme involves treating property on the same 
footing as wives and chi Iren, namely, in common. He criticizes 
Socrates' claim that "everyone" should say that the same thing 
"mine" ( 1261 b 16—32 ) . Soc r at es f a 11 ac i ous 1 y moves b et. ween t wo 
senses of "everyone"s Everyone can say of his own wife, child and 
property that it is "mine," but. he does this as an individual 
<hos hekastos) » This is not Socrates' meaning; he speaks of 
"everyone, but not as individuals" (pantes ouch hos hekastos
au ton b25—27).
Although II, 5 is concerned with whether property should be 
common or not in the best state, it is obviously an 
oversimplification to treat, his argument simply as a "vindication 
of private property rights." For he only takes into account 
three property schemes5 (i) private property, common use; (ii)
common property, private use; and (iii) common property, 
common use. He omits from discussion another optioms Civ) 
private property, private use« He is not defending a system of 
unqualified privatization» Hence, we should take careful note of 
the proviso he adds when he expresses a preference for the 
"present mode, if improved by custom and correct legal order"
( 1263a22—23; cp. 1, 1261a8 where there is no proviso) ,A
Aristotle's way of defending his preferred option is not
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deductive but is deliberative (seeking the better of three 
options) and dialectical (appealing to accepted opinions related 
to property)» He appeals to five different criteria for 
evaluating a property arrangements
1. it does not give rise to quarrels and complaints (5, 
1263a8-21, 27-28, b23-27)
2. it leads to improvement due to greater care being taken 
in the property Í1263a28-29; 3, 126lb33-40; VII, 15,
1299a38)
3« it is consistent with friendship (1263a29—40; cp» VII, 8, 
1328a25-28; 10, 1329b41-1330a2);
4» it fosters natural pleasures, especially of self-love 
(1263a40-b5>;
5» it.· makes possible the exercise of virtues such as
generosity or liberality (1263b5—14; 6, 1265a28-38)»
Aristotle's thesis; is that these criteria taken together show 
that, mode (i ) private property, common use is better than the 
other modes» The omitted option (iv) would no doubt be ruled out 
by appeal to criterion 3 ícp» Dobbs:· 1985, pp» 39-40)» Plato's 
scheme (iii) is ruled out by the other four criteria in 
Aristotle's view» Unfortunately, Aristotle is rather unclear 
throughout this discussion about how these modes differ in 
practice and what exactly his distinction between "common 
property" and "common use" comes to. This has to be gathered 
from the criteria on which he bases his argument. For example, 
both (ii) and (iii) allegedly fail criterion 1 because conflict 
is unavoidable under these schemes;; but Aristotle does not. 
explain how his own scheme (i) does any better» Why does not the 
"common use" of slaves, horses, dogs, or crops lead to the same 
sorts of conflicts as those for which he indicts (ii) arid (iii)?
A straightforward and plausible explanation of why Aristotle 
does not think that this problem will arise for (i) is that he 
takes it for granted the working concept of property rights 
defined in Rhetoric I, 5. In the case of object P and two 
individuals, X', who wants P put to use U, and V", who does not 
want P put to this use, if neither has the right to decide in 
this matter, conflict is the predictable reisu.lt« This is what, 
happens in schemes (ii) and (iii) according to Aristotle» But in 
his scheme (i) for any object P there is some individual X whom 
it is up to to decide how P will bei used, so that conflict can bes 
avoided. Thus although Aristotle recognizes that conflicts occur 
in systems of private property, he still maintains that conflict 
is far more characteristic of common property arrangements.
I think that, criterion 2 should be taken along similar lines. 
Some modern commentators find a parallel between Aristotle's 
argument and the economic argument that property is used more 
efficiently when producers have the incentives associated with 
private ownership»··1' But criterion 2 has not so much to do 
with economic incentives as with the assignment, of authority« For 
what Aristotle says iss "What is common to the greatest number 
receives the least care; for one cares most for private things 
and less for common things or only in so far as he has a share in 
it; for in addition to the other reasons he thinks little about 
it on the grounds that someone else is giving heed to it, just as 
in the household affairs many servants sometimes provide worse
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service than a few." If, as I suppose, Aristotle is tacitly 
assuming the property rights concept of Rhetoric I, 5, his point 
is that an individual X will take greater care of object P to th© 
.extent that the use of P is up to if its use is up to many 
individuals in addition to X will take less care of P on the 
grounds that other people? are taking care of it. This also fits 
the household example, in which a master assigns particular 
spheres of authority to his servants.
This interpretation is also consistent with criterion 3 and 
can be used to explain how he? can reconcile a defense of private 
property with the common use characteristic of friendship. 
Although private property implies that particular individuals 
have rights over particular objects, Aristotle also claims that, 
they should place these objects at. the disposal of their friends» 
As long as some individual has the final say over what friend 
uses what, property criterion 3 is consistent with criterion 1. l'fc- 
is the function of the educational system to habituate 
individuals to share their property as well as to observe limits 
on acquisition of the sort discussed in section 5 (5, 1263a38—40* 
7, 1267b5—9) , Therefore, this criterion rules out a scheme of 
private property, private use, but it is consistent with a schem© 
like (i) in which educated adults retain property rights.
Criteria 4 and 5 can also be better appreciated from the 
standpoint of the property rights interpretation. Criterion 4 
introduces a new line of teleological arguments a property 
scheme is according to nature to the extent that it fostèrs 
natural pleasures of self-love. The case of true self-love is th© 
man who acts according to his own rational judgments "the thing© 
men have done on a rational principle are thought most properly 
thëir own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself» 
then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that 
the good man loves most this part, of him." i 1 True
self-love requires than men be able to act according to their own 
judgment, and the existence of private property provides them the 
sphere in which they can do so,, "
Criterion 5 concerns moral virtues such as .generosity or 
I i beral i ty, the. f unct i on of. which is in the use? of possessions 
(en gar te chresei ton ktenaton to tes eleutheriotetos ergon 
estin, 1263bl3-14). Again, I take Aristotle to be intending an 
argument of the following sorts A property scheme should permit 
the exercise of generosity, which involves the use and alienation 
of property <cp. .^i..c.om.ac.hean Ethics IV, 1, 1119b23-26>„ Since 
one? can act generously generous only if one acts voluntarily and 
by choice, one can act generously only if the use? and alienation 
of property is up to oneself. And this is the case only in a 
system of private ownership.
7. Citizenship and Property
In Politics VII, 9 Aristotle argues that property should 
belong to the citizens of the polis. This argument is part of a 
discussion of "the best polis" (1328b34). After discussing 
"material" questions about the extent and nature of the territory 
and about the number and quality of the citizens (chapters 4-7), 
he turns to the "formal" or structural questions about the
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organization of .the .polis, '(chapters· 8~12). The distribution of 
property is one■of these -formal .questions.
This discussion begins with an argument in chapter 8 that in 
the case of the polis, as in that, of other natural wholes, a 
distinction must be made between its parts and conditions which 
are necessary for its existence. Aristotle argues that, a part of 
the polis must, satisfy two requirements! it must perform a 
necessary function of the polis (1328b3-5>, and it must be 
capable; of participating in the common end of the polis (of,, 
a33—37) . In the best polis this end is the best life -.possible, 
eudaiaonia, which is the perfect realization and employment of 
virtue;, and in deviant states it will be something less than 
this. But in any case; the parts of the polis can include only 
.those; who are; capable of participating .in the end of the polis»
Hence, property .- including slaves, even though they are living
creatures . is a necessary means but not part of the
■polis(a33—35)« Among the other classes (gene) which satisfy the 
first indispensability requirement are farmers, soldiers, the 
wealthy, priests, and judges (b5—23).
In chapter 9 Aristotle argues that only some of these classes 
can satisfy the participation requirement. The argument, proceeds 
as follows' (1328b33-1329a2>s
1 » The best, constitution is that under which the polis will 
be most happy.
2. Happiness requires moral virtue (c.p„ 1, 1323b29—36; 8 ,
1328a37-38)»
3» The best, polis is best governed and possesses men who are; 
just without qualification and not. just relative to a 
hypothesis <cp. IV, 7, 1293b3>.
4» CThose who are just without qualification fulfil the end 
of the best, constitution.!
5. Therefore, the best polis possesses men with moral 
virtue.
6 . Leisure is necessary for moral virtue and political 
activities.
7. Farmers do not have leisure.
8» The life of mechanics and tradesmen is ignoble and
inimical to virtue (cp. Ill, 5, 1278a20-21; VIII, 2 , 
13337bll—15)»
10. Therefore, the citizens must be men of leisure but not 
mechanics or husbandmen in the best state (cp. Ill, 5, 
1278a17-20)
Aristotle next contends that the military and 
deliberative-juridical groups are especially parts of the best 
polis. Rather than treating them as two distinct classes or gene 
as Plato does, Aristotle argues that the tasks of soldier and 
delibérator— jurist should be carried out by the same people at 
different agess
It remains therefore to a assign these constitutional rights 
(ten politeian tauten) to both, the same classes, not, 
however, at the same time but just as strength belongs to 
younger men by nature (pephuken) and practical wisdom to 
older men, it is expedient and just for them to be 
distributed; for this division is accordinq to merit 
E 1329al3—171!.·
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According to this argument the constitution should assign and 
distribute political rights or powers according to natural 
justice. The argument, which immediately follows (al7—26) traces 
the implications of this tor property: "Moreover (alia men),
properties should also be centered around these persons ..." I 
reconstruct this argument as follows:
1. [The hyothesis of the best polis is that happiness is the 
end. 3 (Tacit. premiss)'
2. A polis should not be called happy by viewing a part of 
it but by viewing all of the citizens (cp, 2,
1324a23—25)»
3. Happiness must exist with moral virtue.
4. [Therefore, all and only those capable of moral virtue 
share in the polis,, i.e., are citizens of the best
polis.3
4. The military and deliberative-juridical members aré 
capable of moral virtue (see argument above).
5» Therefore, soldiers and deliberator-jurists are citizens 
of the best polis.
6. Citizens of the best polis must have prosperity 
(eupor ian).
7. [Prosperity requires property.3
8« Therefore, property must be in the hands of (peri) the 
citizens of the best polis <cp. Susemi hi and Hicks 1894, 
p. 510).
9. Mechanics and other vulgar classes are not "demiurges of 
virtue." (cp, III, 9, 1280a33)
10. Therefore, mechanics and other vulgar classes are not 
citizens of the best polis.
11. The'farmers are slaves or barbarian serfs.
12» Therefore, property will belong [exclusively?] to the 
military and deliberative-juridical members.
There are obvious difficulties with the argument, even if one 
accepts the premisses on which Aristotle bases it, for example, 
that farmers, mechanics, merchants, and generally all individuals 
in the polis who work for a living and do not belong to the 
leisure class are incapable of moral virtue. For if, as seems to 
be the case, Aristotle wants the conclusion to be that property 
belongs exclusively to the soldiers and councillors, this does 
not follow from his premisses. (12) so understood would follow 
only if (8 ) also included "exclusively," but. that would not. 
follow from (6) and (7). Hence, his premisses in fact leave open 
the possibility that free noncitizens might possess property as 
well. The issue is further complicated by the fact, that the 
summary in chapter 10 describes the previous argument as dealing 
with land (ten choran, 1329b36—38), prompting the question 
question of whether the earlier argument was intended to be 
restricted to land rather than to the movable property, including 
tools of the trade, which might 'belong to artisans and laborers 
(cp. Newman 1887, I, p. 198 n. 3). However, the summary may not 
be Aristotle's (cf. Susemihl and Hicks 1894, p, 516).
Of greater interest here are Aristotle's first two premisses. 
(1) which states the hypothesis of the best polis is essentially 
the same consequenti alist, eudaimonist principle which we have 
seen at work in Rhetor!c I, 5 and Politics I. But (2) introduces
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a clearly distributive element as wells the end is not merely 
happiness, but happiness realized by al 1 of the citizens., The 
principle is foreshadowed at 2, 1324a23-25; "It is evident that 
the constitution is that order under which.anyone. <hostisoun) may 
act best and live blessedly." <Cp„ also II, 5, 1264b17-19, which 
this significantly strengthens),, Aristotle applies this 
distributive principle in VII, 10, when he argues in favor of a 
proposal (adopted from Plato's Laws V 7450 that, eaxch person's 
property should be divided into two lots, one near and the 
frontier and one near the city. "in order that two lots may be 
distributed to each person and everyone may have a share of both 
districts. For in this way there is equality (to ison> and 
justice (to dikaion) and greater unanimity regarding border wars" 
.( 1330al4—IS) » Thus, Aristotle argues that property should be 
distributed not only on the basis of considerations of expediency 
or security but also on the basis of considerations of 
distributive justice» <Cp„ VI, 3, 1318bl—5 where to ison kai to 
dikaion is applied to political rights, viz. voting.)■Hence, this 
argument adds to the preceding arguments the idea in the best 
polis each citizen has a right to a share of property based on a 
principle of distributive justice.
The argument of VII, 9-10 also differs from the preceding 
arguments in the importance which it places upon citizenship as a 
basis for property rights. The relationship between political 
rights and property rights in Aristotle may be compared to Joseph 
Raz's distinction between core rights and derivative rights 
(1984, p. 198). A core right, is justified directly on the basis 
of some some aspect of a person's well being or interests, 
whereas the justification of a derivative right includes the 
assertion of some other right. In VII, 9-10 Aristotle is arguing 
that individuals in the polis who have the capacity for happiness 
and moral virtue have a core right to citizenship and a share in 
the government. Political rights are core rights because the 
exercise of these rights is constitutive of happiness and the 
good life. But since citizenship can be exercised only by those 
who have sufficient property to afford them with leisure, 
citizens also have a derivative right to property. When 
Aristotle summarily concludes in VII, 9 that property should 
belong exclusively to citizens he may simply be taking it for 
granted that if property rights cannot be justified as derivative 
from political rights they cannot be justified at all. This 
priority of political over property rights in Aristotle is 
fundamentally at. variance with thepriority of property to 
government in Locke (cp. Mathie 1979, p. 17) and is rooted in the 
basic principles of the Poli ti cs, most importantly, the 
principles of I, 2 that man is a political animal and the polis 
is prior to the individual·
8. Summary and Applications
In the introduction I stated a number of questions which a 
theory of rights might, be expected to answer. On my 
interpretation, I take Aristotle's theory to be offering the 
following answers;
(1) Who has rights to property? He offers two different 
answers in the Pol_i.tics; it is the citizen of the best polis in
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Politics. VÎI and the householder in Book. I. As a matter of 
justice every citizen of· the best polis should be a land-holding 
householder (VII, 9-10), In the polity, which he regards as the 
best of the deviant poleis, the citizens have moderate and 
sufficient property (IV, 11, 1295b39—40)« Moreover, in democracy 
he suggests that "the proceeds of the public revenues should be 
collected and distributed among its poor, especially, if 
possible, in such quantities as may enable them to acquire a 
small estate, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or 
farming (VI, 5, 1320a35-bl), The focus in these discussions
is on land. It is evidently taken for granted, but not stated, 
that artisans and and other lower classes possess movable 
property (cp, Newman 1887, I, p. 198 n. 3).
(2> To·what objects do they have property rights? The answer 
gi ven in Rhetor i c I, 5 is .land (including dwellings), movable 
objects, animals, and slaves. Although this answer is accepted in 
the Pol i tics. Aristotle assumes important distinctions between 
land and other forms of property,
(3) What, form does the exercise of property rights take? 
According to Rhetoric I, 5 this consists of two elements!! X 
possesses P in such a way that the use of P is up to X and the 
alienation of P (giving it away or selling it) is up to X. I 
have argued that this concept is presupposed throughout 
Aristotle's treatments of private property in the Pol it.ics.
(4) What, is the general moral justification for the thesis 
that individuals have property rights? I have surveyed four 
principal stretches of argument. These rely upon a number of 
A r i s t o t e 1 i a n p r i n c i p les, f or e x. a m p 1 e, t. h a t h a p p i n e s s a n d i t s 
parts should be protected and promoted, that nature provides all 
living things with what, is necessary for living and attaining 
their ends, and that everyone should in justice and fairness have 
the things necessary for the exercise of moral virtue and 
citizenship in the polis» I have suggested that there are two at. 
least two sorts of tensions among the different lines of argument 
which Aristotle offers for private property ownerships First, 
some of his arguments treat property rights as core rights 
because? the use of property is itself a part of the human end -of 
eudaimon i a, whereas other other arguments treat the possess si on of 
property as a derivative right because it is a necessary 
condition for certain core rights (viz, political rights) but 
having and using property are not treated as constitutive? 
elements of the? good life. Second, sometimes his arguments 
appear to be-purely consequentialist, justifying property 
ownership as necessary for the ends of the human being or the 
polis, but sometimes the arguments also introduce considerations 
of justice and fairness, emphasizing that al 1 relevant, persons 
have rights to property,
(5) Under what circumstances do individuals justly acquire 
title to specific objects and under what circumstances do they 
come to possess them unjustly? Aristotle recognizes a number of 
different ways in which property can be justly acquired!: original 
acquisition from nature (hunting, farming, etc.), barter, cash 
exchange, gifts, inheritance, and distribution by the government. 
(Aristotle is often faulted for not employing a labor theory of 
acquisition (cf. e.g. Susemihl and Hicks 1894, p„ 28), but it has
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become clear in recent discussions by Nozick and others that, the 
labor theory itself is not free.of difficulty.) Aristotle like 
Locke attaches certain condi tions.to the just acquisition of 
property; An individual X can justly acquire object P provided 
that (i) the natural end of X' is superior to the natural end of P 
(if P has one), (ii) in acquiring P, X does not exceed his 
natural limit, and (iii) X' does not unjustly take P from some 
other person. 1 see no evidence, however, that Aristotle is 
committed to the view that X owns P only if X' uses P to perform a 
virtuous act or puts P to common use (e.g. shares it with a 
friend). To be sure, Aristotle argues that individuals should be 
able to acquire property because they need it in order to perform 
virtuous and friendly acts; and he directs the legislators to 
.institute public education to habituate the citizens to this end. 
But it does not follow from this that the just acquisition of 
each piece of property is contingent on the performance of a 
virtuous and friendly act.'5’
• (6) Under what circumstances, if any, are property rights 
defeasible or quail fiable? This is a most complicated and 
difficulted question to which I can only sketch'an answer here. 
Newman remarks that Aristotle's defense of private property in 
Politics. 11 , 5 i s η g t e >·: p r e s & 1 y c o u p 1 e d w i t h q u a X i f i c a t i ο n s
( 1087 , I , pp « 199.200) , but Ari stotle in f act endorses various
soc i al pol :i. c :i. es wh :i. ch trench upon pr i vate pr oepr ty r i gh.ts s he 
e n d q r s e e p u b 3. :i. e p r o p e r t y , p o s i t i v e d u t i e s ο n t h e p a r t o f p r i v a t e 
property owners, X imitations and equal ization of Xand hold!ngs„ 
r est r i c t i ons on al i enat i on , and even ostr ac i sm agai nst the very 
wealthy,, Nevertheless, I believe that Aristotle's theory can be 
s h o w n t o b e o n t h e w h o 3. e c o h e r e n t «
Aristotle argues that part of the land of the best polis must 
be common in order to provide for common needs, including common 
meals and service to the gods (Pol i t i cs VII, 10),, He also 
recommends that public monies be used for the needy in deviant 
peléis (III, 5, 1320b 1-25 cp. Constitution of Athens 49) But 
it should be.remarked that Aristotle's .arguments for private 
property rights do not commit him to the total privatization of 
the polis's resources. His position might be compared to modern 
political philosophers who favor private property rights on 
general principle, but also recognize the need for nonprivate 
solutions to problems of "public, goods" and for the provision of 
a social safety net for those who cannot help themselves.
Moreover, private property owners have positive duties to the 
polis, especially of providing revenues both for internal needs 
and for the purposes of wair (VII, 8 , 1328bl0-ll; III, 12,
1283al8). But this is consistent with his position that property 
rights are derivative from and subordinate to political 
r i g ht s and r esp on si ta i 1 i t i es. Ar i sto11e also p r esc r i b es t h at 
those who can afford it should provide support so that no citizen 
should lack the means of subsistence;, both in the best polis 
(VII, 10, 1329b41—1330a2) and in deviant constitutions (VI, 6 , 
1320b2 ff. ) . But. he perceives these as virtuous acts and as 
ap p1i c at i on s of his'principle of "p r i vat e own ership, common use„" 
Aristotle repeatedly advocates limits upon the? amount of land 
which any individual can accumulate. This is implied in his 
statement in VII, 10 each citizen of the best state should have
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two lots of land (cp. also II, 7, 1267bl2—13)» He also approves 
of laws in democracies which prohibit individuals from acquiring 
more than a certain measure <metron) (VI, 4, 1319a8—10)» He also 
favors the inalienability of lands ie. he wants to restrict the 
right to sell and bequeath land (exousia didonai kai kataleipein, 
II, 9, 1270al8—21). However, one of his arguments for this is 
suggestives in oligarchies gifts and inheritances should toe 
restricted so that properties are more on a level and mare of the 
poor could establish themselves as prosperous (V, 8, 1309a23—26) . 
Because Aristotle excessive acquisition of property by any 
citizen as contrary to nature and thus unjust and as depriving 
other citizens of the means to the good life, he would regard 
these restrictions upon acquisition and alienation as just as 
well as expedient. . .
Ostracism provides a more extreme and difficult case.. 
Aristotle seems to acknowledge that there may be some political 
justice idikaion polit ikon) if the citizens of a deviant polis or 
even of the best polis decide to ostracize one of the number who 
is extraordinarily wealthy (III, 13, 1284bl5-34; VI, 8, 1308b19)« 
But Aristotle defends the practice as just as well as expedient, 
and he could justify ostracism on the grounds that the extremely 
wealthy man has egregiously exceeded the natural bounds of 
acquisition and that he has thereby accumulated so much power 
than he is jeopardizing the constitution and the political rights 
of his fellow citizens.
In sum, these restrictions which Aristotle places upon 
property rights may be justified on the basis of features of the 
general theory mentioned above; the provisos on the acquisition 
of property, the subordination of property rights to political 
rights and duties, and the "private property, common use" 
doctrine.
It should, finally, not be overlooked that property rights 
place certain constraints upon the conduct of governments 
according to Aristotle. Specifcally he criticises confiscation 
by democratic majorities of the property of wealthier citizens 
(VI, 3, 1318a25-26¡¡ cp» III, 10, 1281a21) . He explicitly 
rejects the conventionalist argument that whatever law the 
majority decides to enact is just, objecting that even if the 
majority wants it, such confiscation is un 1 ust (adikesousi 
deaeuontes ta ton plousion kai elattonon) „ That is the? property 
owner has a claim of justice, a right, against other citizens 
which is violated by the law of confiscation.
I conclude that Aristotle addresses the questions that must 
be answered by a theory of property rights. His way of 
developing, justifying, and qualifying his views on wealth and 
property can be understood in terms of a property rights model. 
And the policies he recommends for both the? best polis and for 
deviant constitutions are illuminated by this model. Although I 
have concentrated in this draft upon exegesis rather than 
criticism, I think that the property rights interpretation also 
brings to light difficulties and tensions within Aristotle's 
thought on property.
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Notes
Λ0η the location of e *e see Grimaldi 1980 ad 1oc.
“Although I find persuasive John's Cooper's arguments that 
"flourishing" is generally the preferable translation of 
eudai»onian I conform to the customary "happiness" in order to 
avoid unnecessary confusion.
■»For <A> compare Politics VII, 1, 1323b21-23; 3, 1325a32, 
bl2—16ϋ also Plato Charmides 172a. For <B> compare Nicomachean 
Ethics' I. 5, 1097b7—21 ; 7, 1177a27-b4; F(hetoric I, 5, 1360b23.
For (C) compare Rhetoric I, 5, 1360b28.
^Aristotle's enumeration of these parts is complicated, 
seemingly redundant, and possibly inconsistent. On the ways of 
counting and classifying these parts see Grimaldi 1980, pp. 
106-107.
»The importance of these principles for Aristotle's political 
theory is made very clear in D» Keyt's unpublished "Three. 
Fundamental Theorems in Aristotle's Politics." to which I am also 
indebted for these references. As Keyt also remarks the sphere 
of justice is not the natural as such, but is confined to conduct 
involving at least two human beings (Nicomachean Ethics V, 1,
1129b25—27, 1130al0-13; 11, 1138aI9-20;X, 8 ~ ÎÏ78b8-T2).
AIn omitting the fourth mode of property while representing 
himself as defending the "present mode,” Aristotle may be 
exhibiting what Francis Sparshott has referred to as his 
"subversive traditionalism." Aristotle comes forward as a 
defender of a traditional customs such as slavery, female 
inferiority, and private property, but in the course of defending 
radically redefines them,· so that, in effect, the traditional 
institutions have been subverted and undermined (cp. also Barker 
1906, p„ 394 n. 1)
"'Cp. the op-ed piece by Richard Critchfield in the Nov. 16, 
1985 New Y or k T i mes comparing the current economic reforms in the 
People's Republic of China with Aristotle's arguments in Politics. 
II, 5. The modern commentators are, of course, principally“ “  
interested in the ownership of land and capital used to produce 
goods for consumption, whereas Aristotle, as we have.seen, is 
elsewhere concerned with practical property which can be directly 
used in the activities which constitute the good life. 
Nevertheless, the example which he uses to introduce the three 
options at Poli tics II, 5, 1262b40—8 includes land as well as the 
food grown on it, from which it. is evident that Aristotle intends 
his argument to apply to productive as well as practical 
property.
»Following Drei zehnter I retain amphoterois in 1329al3 with 
the MSS. On this use of politeia of. Newman III, p. 379 who 
notes a parallel at II, 5, 1264a38.
^Dobbs (1985, p„ 40, n. 9) interprets Aristotle as here 
maintaining, "paradoxically, only if one shares his property with 
another can it be said that he has truly acquired it. This is 
the insight, that lies beneath Aristotle's otherwise puzzling use 
of the verbal and substantive forms of 'possession.' In other- 
words it is in a liberal action that it first comes to light that 
a possession iktema) can be one's own apart from the? active 
possessing (ktesis) or hoarding of it. Thus only the liberal man 
will feel genuine, natural pleasure in ownership." Aristotle 
would agree with the conclusion, but not, I think, with the
Aristotle on Property .Rights
Page 21
premisses which Dobbs attributes to him. For the uses of kteseis 
and ktematon indicate that liberality or generosity is concerned 
with both of them. Recall also the definitions at I, 4, 
1253b3i-32 which imply that ktesis is a collection of ktemata,, 
Aristotle's point is not that X can acquire Y only if X shares it 
with Z but that X ought to share Y with Z and that in order to do 
so X must be able to acquire title to Y.
10Cf. Jones 1956, p. 198, who also cites Constitution of 
Athens 56.2 and Demosthenes 17.15 for the historical importance 
of this issue. Aristotle also recommends that confiscation in 
democracies be discouraged by limiting, the uses to which the 
confiscated property can be put. (VI, 5, 1320a5-10) ·
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